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ABSTRACT 
The paper assesses housing as a global issue affecting wide sectors of societies 
not just in less developed countries. Trends and cases show the crucial role that 
building industry cycles have played in the financialization of the economy and 
its speculative side effects, even in sectors presented as alternatives to 
mainstream production, as the sharing economy. We are, therefore, 
experiencing a radical change today in the meanings attached to terms like city, 
identity, rights, and growing inequalities affecting ever-larger shares of the 
population. When the fundamental human right to housing is denied the social 
bonds and trust on which citizenship relies is lost. 
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1. HOUSING   REVISITED 
Housing is a slippery issue. It is the typical subject easily doomed to be 
underrated, even in the long aftermath of the 2008 crisis: a subject at once too 
technical to be publicly discussed in full knowledge of the facts while deeply 
affecting people's lives, radically putting into question social bonds and the very 
heart of the sense of belonging and citizenship, as in the case, strictly related, of 
labour 2. 
Besides, housing is at the crossroads of a lot of crucial issues, so it is an 
appropriate touchstone for an interdisciplinary dialogue – a vital character of iASK 
milieu – involving, as it were, the two riverbanks (‘hard’ and ‘soft’) of the 
knowledge's stream. In this regard, it is ironic (and disappointing) that, already in 
the early sixties, John Burchard, in writing the conclusions to an important 
 
 
1The present essay, written while being recipient of a iASK Research Scholarship in 2019, has also benefited of 
the stimulating discussions with the interdisciplinary research group Urban Forms of Life of the University of 
Rome - La Sapienza (Department of Philosophy, Department of Architecture and Design) coordinated by  
Stefano Velotti, and, of course, of the constant, enriching, friendly dialogue with Giorgio Mangani and Orville  
Pantaleoni of the Lab LABIRINTO. 
2 Castells’ statement about labour (“in modern societies, paid working time structures social time”, Castells, 1 99G: 
4G8-70) can be complemented by claiming that housing, in its turn, structures social space. 
DOI: 10.14267/RETP2021.03.06 
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collection of essays concerning the city as historical subject could plainly affirm 
that “all the world tries to be interdisciplinary” [Handlin and Burchard, 19G3: 251]. 
A firmly held belief not so popular nowadays among academic bureaucracies. 
The line of reasoning that I will develop is the following: 
• the first part is an assessment of housing as a global issue, affecting wide 
sectors of societies not just in less developed countries, as far as households’  
chances to make a decent living are concerned. Some trends and cases are 
taken into account, showing the crucial role that building industry cycles 
have played in the financialization of the economy and its speculative 
effects, even in sectors presented as an alternative way to the mainstream, 
as the sharing economy. Notwithstanding we are experiencing a radical 
change today, in terms of the meanings attached to terms like city, identity, 
rights, the growing inequalities affecting ever-larger shares of the 
population, still lie along the same fault lines of old edges, while new 
phenomena are emerging along other edges; 
• the second part will focus on the consequences of such change on the ways 
people perceive their attachment to the places they live in, as an integral part 
of the stuff of which the basic glue of any social bond is made: trust. If 
intended spatially, when the fundamental human right to housing (as 
dwelling and sociality) is denied the social bonds on which citizenship relies 
end up in tatters, and the supposed isomorphism between space and 
sociability is nothing but a ghost. 
1.1 Housing Back in the Spotlight 
First and foremost, the global character of the housing’s issue must be asserted 
and cannot be overstated, despite the local different contexts, requiring specific 
solutions. 
The shift to what has been called the “neoliberal city” [Hackworth, 2007; 
Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 2002; Theodore, Peck and Brenner, 2011] 
has represented a global transition, involving left-wing as well as right-wing 
governments started with the crisis of the Fordist (the city of production) and 
Keynesian (the city of consumption) models of urbanism in the ’70s [Farinelli, 
2018: 197]. 
The oil crisis of 1973 triggered then the neoliberal wave which, notwithstanding 
the mainstream association with the end-of-the-state claim – so popular in the 
aftermath of the Fall of Berlin Wall –, actually was the “fix” to the new 
accumulation cycle [see below, 1.2]: 
Because of the reduction of national interventions in housing, local 
infrastructure, welfare, and the like, localities are forced either to finance such 
areas themselves or to abandon them entirely. Eric Swyngedouw has deemed this 
59 The Complexity of Uncertainties 
 
larger process “glocalization”, as it involves a simultaneous upward (to the global 
economy and its institutions) and downward (to the locality and its governance 
structures) propulsion of regulatory power previously held or exercised by the 
nation-state. Given its geographically and temporally contingent nature, however, 
this process has affected different national contexts in different ways (…). The 
rollback/destruction of Keynesian interventions and the roll-out/creation of more 
proactively neoliberal policies are thus highly contingent, incremental, uneven, 
and largely incomplete. The resultant policy landscape is highly segmented— 
geographically and socially—and almost randomly strewn with concentrations of 
Keynesian artifacts (such as public housing) alongside roll-out neoliberal policies 
(such as workfare) in different places and in different stages of creation or 
destruction. Thus, while it is useful to suggest that policy ideas in North America 
and Europe are increasingly dominated by a unified, relatively simple set of ideas 
(neoliberalism), it is just as clear that the institutional manifestation (mainly 
through policy) of these ideas is highly uneven across and within countries 
[Hackworth, 2007: 12]. 
Housing so is a revealing litmus test of the failure of the much-heralded 
markets’ ‘natural’ capacity of guaranteeing freedom and equity, which through  
international institutions like WB or IMF has ensured the mindless adoption of 
neoliberal recipes as an undisputed orthodoxy, as articles of faith, all over the 
world. 
It is not by chance then that the urban sustainable development goal of the UN 
includes the target 11.1, ensuring access for all citizens to adequate, safe and 
affordable housing and basic services by 2030 [EC 201G] and that access to adequate 
housing is also the focus of one of the partnerships in the Urban Agenda for the 
EU3, or that in 201G, UN special rapporteur on adequate housing, Leilani Farha, in 
partnership with United Cities and Local Government and the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched ‘The Shift’, a 
global movement bringing together all levels of governments, civil society, 
different institutions and academia to reclaim the fundamental human right to 
housing 4. 
Housing has turned out to be a problem so great, that cities are taking action 
either individually or, more often, in-network, even taking a stand against tourism 
impact: an industry that, for many of them, represent one of (if not the) most 
substantial items of their budget revenue. 
In July 2018, in a joint statement to the United Nations, the cities of 




3 See: https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/housing. 
4 See: http://www.unhousingrapp.org/the-shift. 
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declared that citizens’ rights to affordable housing are being jeopardised following  
the growing influence of speculators, investors and mass tourism on the urban 
property market 5. 
Besides, another mainstream practice, the so-called sharing economy – meant 
originally to increase and enhance the experience of contact between residents 
and tourists – has been turning into a huge problem for municipalities, in the case 
of its most renowned and impressively expanding success story: Airbnb. 
My colleagues from Siena University G have been monitoring in the recent years 
the phenomenon. Just to give some clue about a situation more and more affecting 
small places (which are more vulnerable to such logic): 
• inequality is extremely high in all the cities in the report, and is constantly 
increasing in the vast majority of cities examined; 
• in most cities a handful of operators listing several properties are capable 
of amassing more than two-thirds of the total revenues generated on the 
website; 
• real estate agencies often use front men to concentrate in disguise property 
for short-term rent (useless for workers or students: today in Bologna is 
quite impossible for students to find an affordable rent within the city 
walls); 
• ten European municipalities (Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin, Barcelona, 
Bruxelles, Bordeaux, Munich, Kraków, Valencia, Wien) wrote a letter to the 
EU Commission asking for an urgent debate over Airbnb affecting 
affordable housing in historic centres. The letter was also caused by a 
recent opinion of the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice, 
claiming that Airbnb is a platform for digital services not a real estate 
agency, then it is not obliged to force its customers to comply with the 
local fiscal laws. 
While there has been progress since 2008 with regard to the Europe 2020 
objectives on climate change and energy, education and more recently, access to 
employment, the objectives of fighting poverty and social exclusion remain 
completely out of reach. More than one person in three in OECD countries is 
economically vulnerable, lacking sufficient liquid financial assets to maintain their 
living standard above the poverty threshold for at least three months. 
Anyway, in the EU overall, the share of GDP devoted to social protection has 




5 See: https://citiesforhousing.org/. 
G See: https://ladestlab.it/maps/73/the-airification-of-cities-report. 
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to the composition of expenditure, in 201G, 45.G% of social protection expenditure 
in the EU was spent on old age and survivors benefits, 3G.9% on sickness, disability 
and healthcare, 8.7% on families and children, 4.7% on unemployment and just 
4.2% on housing and social exclusion (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. EU breakdown of social expenditure in 2016 (Source: Eurostat) 
 
Housing expenditure is taking up increasing amounts of household budgets, 
particularly in poor households. Despite improvements in the material condition 
of housing across the EU, unfit housing continues to affect the quality of life of  
many Europeans, particularly the most vulnerable (Fig. 2). 




(Source: FEANTSA -Fondation Abbé Pierre) 
 
Figure 2. Housing as a factor of poverty in 2019 
 
In 2017, European Union households spent more than EUR 2,000 billion on 
‘housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuel’ (i.e. 13.1% of the EU's GDP). Of all 
these areas of spending, housing has seen the biggest increase over the last ten 
years (ahead of spending on transport, food, health, communications, culture, 
education, etc.): households spent 24.2% of their total expenditure on housing in 
2017, an increase of 1.5 points compared to 2007. 
In the majority of European Union countries, inequality has increased 
concerning housing expenditure: – in some countries (Denmark, Austria, Italy, 
France, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal), the budget allocated to 
housing fell for the population as a whole between 2007 and 2017 but increased 
for poor households; – in other countries (Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Slovenia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Finland), this budget increased for all households, 
and poor households to a greater extent (Fig. 3) [Serme-Morin, Coupechoux, 2019]. 




(Source: FEANTSA -Fondation Abbé Pierre) 
 
Figure 3. Average proportion of households’ disposable income spent on housing 
in 2017 
 
The complexity of housing’s issue is also emphasised by other markers of 
inequality, like the urban heritage in decay and/or unused. 
Physical decay in housing estates today is matched by a lowering of social status 
and ethnic segregation. Especially in Western and Northern European cities, there 
is spatial clustering of social issues, with housing estates at the forefront since they 
provide affordable housing (when compared with other segments of the housing 
sector). Consequently, many housing estates have over time become troubling 
sites – generating social dysfunction, poverty, ethnic concentration and isolation 
[Baldwin Hess, Tammaru and van Ham eds, 2018: 7]. 
In all major cities, empty homes have become more and more a common trait, 
with Paris’ 107,000 empty homes, New York City 318,831 vacant units in 2015, or  
Sydney, where 118,499 vacant units were counted in 2013. At the same time, there 
is a paradox concerning this growing amount of empty homes if contrasted with 
growing populations seeking accommodation and the amount of speculation that 
is not declining [Punwasi, 2017]. 
In Italy, there are over 740 thousand real estate structures in a state of neglect, 
including palaces, villas, ecclesiastical buildings, industrial facilities, G thousand 
kilometres of unused railways and about 1,700 stations, in addition to the high 
number of large public buildings, such as hospitals, barracks and sanatoriums no 
longer in use (Fig. 4). 






Figure 4. Unused and neglected structures and buildings in Italy in 2019 (Source: Istat] 
 
1.2 The Art of Rent in a Global Perspective 
To explain the role real estate and rent play in the neoliberal city, it is necessary 
to sum up the mechanism of accumulation crisis and the Spatio-temporal fix 
[Harvey, 1982, 2001a, 2001b, 2012; Arrighi, 2007, Jessop, 2004]. 
In a nutshell: 
1. The capital needs to be fixed in and on the land to develop; at the same 
time, when it is successful, it needs to be freed to find new profitable 
places to avoid devaluation (overaccumulation crises), reinvesting the 
exceeding capital. 
2. So, temporarily, the devaluation of capital caused by the 
overaccumulation crisis can be time-shifted or spatially fixed. Such a 
solution to crises is called accumulation by dispossession, i.e., the 
reinvestment of exceeding capital in new areas devaluating the original 
ones. 
3. Both the temporal shifting and the spatial fixing not only produce just 
temporary solutions but deeply involve the human habitat. The 
devaluation of the previously fixed capital hit by disinvestment measures 
to open new profitable space will entail the devastation of the human 
habitat as well. 
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4. The neoliberal city has pushed such contradiction to the extreme: 
a. Through the financialization of real estate, 
b. and the downturn, decline, and devaluation of public places. 
In the post-war period, developed economies have experienced two basic 
trends in the net capital share of aggregate income: the first, a rise during the last 
several decades, and a proportional fall continued until the 1970s. So, while the net 
capital share has increased since 1948, in disaggregating data it appears that such 
increase is basically from the housing sector, while the other sectors contributed 
very little or nothing at all. This means that the growth of wealth (above all of the 
richest minority) originated from the rising value of their property. As Rognlie 
[2015] pointed out, this is not due to the hoarding of properties in a few hands; but 
because the market value of the real estate has been growing over the last three 
decades (Fig. 5). 
The push, particularly in the 2000s, towards "financialization" is a global 
phenomenon that, in the case, for example, of large pharmaceutical companies has 
generated the massive dislocation of investments intended for research in the 
direction of stock exchange operations aimed at increasing their equity value – in 
particular with the repurchase of own shares (share buyback) to increase their 
market value. Pfizer, for example, in 2011 repurchased its own shares for a value 
equivalent to 90% of its net profit and 99% of its R&D expenses; all while the state 
expenditure for research, direct or indirect, has been growing [Mazzuccato, 2018: 
31-4]. 
(Source: The Economist, modified by the author) 
 
Figure 5. Evolution over time of net capital share of aggregate income in US, Britain, 
France, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Germany (1948-2010) 
compared with the housing’s disaggregated data 
GG REVIEW OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY 2021/3 
 
Besides, as emphasised by many authors (among them Harvey himself), “the 
value of property, especially the kinds of property that have risen most 
dramatically in value over the last thirty years, derives to a great extent from 
intangibles” [Haskel and Westlake, 2018: 1GG]. 
The fact is that today culture has been enlisted as an economic resource. As 
effectively summed up by David Harvey, 
the knowledge and heritage industries, the vitality and ferment of cultural 
production, signature architecture and the cultivation of distinctive aesthetic 
judgments have become powerful constitutive elements in the politics of urban 
entrepreneurialism in many places (particularly Europe). The struggle is on to 
accumulate marks of distinction and collective symbolic capital in a highly 
competitive world. But this brings in its wake all of the localized questions about 
whose collective memory, whose aesthetics, and whose benefits are to be 
prioritized [Harvey, 2012: 10G]. 
In the case of Mediterranean cities, through the promotion of international 
events like Olympic Games, World Cups, World Fairs, G8; urban renewal 
programmes concerning cities’ disused areas (like docklands) or considered in  
decay (like parts of historic centres; European programmes like the European 
Capital of Culture, we have witnessed a huge and enduring flow of public and 
private investments which radically has been transforming large areas of 
Mediterranean cities, on both shores, mostly led by the monopoly rent logic. 
In all these cases, what Harvey calls “the art of rent” [Harvey cit.: 74-5, 100-5] is 
the very engine of change. Such programmes indeed, while enhancing decaying or 
unoccupied areas, through the spillover effect of the rent have increased nearby 
property prices in surrounding districts, so reducing affordable housing chances 
in favour of high-income residential lots and forcing the relocation of low-income 
residents [Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 2002]. 
Monopoly rent follows a logic which, while investing in concrete, material 
things, like buildings and infrastructures in localised areas, is anyway mainly 
linked to the financial market, whose very nature is global. To attract external 
investments, in the wake of neoliberal policies, cities have to accept competition 
on the international scale, then implementing big plans and urban developments 
radically changing not only areas somehow abandoned, but also all the 
neighbourhoods bordering the areas involved, rising dramatically real estate 
prices, so expelling not-affluent residents and small economic activities, and, 
above all, attracting all the tourism-related business as well as pushing local 
business to focus on goods and services for tourists. 
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1.3 What Does ‘Homeless’ Mean? 
In 2005, the United Nations undertook the task of calculating the world’s 
homeless population, listing an estimated 100 million people. The fact is, that 
there is no internationally accepted definition of what homelessness is, and, 
considering the weight of ‘hidden homelessness’, 100 million is very likely an  
underestimation. 
‘Homelessness’ covers a range of situations well more numerous and diversified 
than in the past. 
In Japan's case, the government estimates that among the 15,000 people who 
spent the night at manga cafés about 4,000 are technically homeless. Known as 
‘cyber homeless’ the most common are people between the ages of 30s and 50s,  
accounting for 38.5 percent and 27.9 percent respectively. Several low-wage 
Japanese employees earn little money, making them ineligible for welfare while 
preventing them to rent a flat in Tokyo [Paul, 2015]. 
Homelessness in Australia is a very interesting case, in the way the official 
definition of homelessness puts into relation housing and the sense of belonging. 
The Australian definition of the Australian Bureau of Statistics points out the 
complexity of the issue: home, not house or roof. The ABS statistical definition 
states that when a person does not have suitable accommodation alternatives they 
are considered homeless if their current living arrangement: 
• “is in a dwelling that is inadequate; or 
• has no tenure, or if their initial tenure is short and not extendable; or 
• does not allow them to have control of, and access to space for social  
relations” 7. 
The ABS definition of homelessness is informed by a conception that 
emphasises the core meanings attached to ‘home’, including a sense of security, 
stability, privacy, safety, and the ability to control living space. To ABS, then, 
homelessness is a lack of one or more of the elements that represent 'home'. 
The definition has been built focusing on the adequacy of the dwelling; security 
of tenure in the dwelling; but also access to space for social relations. If the UN 
were to accept Australia’s definition, their estimate would exceed 1.G billion – 
roughly 20 percent of the population. 
Such definition, while being questionable on statistical grounds, has dared to 
point out and underline an element often overlooked when it comes to housing, 
which drives us to widen our theoretical framework: after having considered the 
housing topic within the spatial dynamic of capitalism, we will look at it from the 
perspective of the public space. 
 
 
7 See: Australian Bureau of Statistics definition of homelessness, italics added. 
G8 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY 2021/3 
 
2. A TALE OF TWO CITIES 
The distinguished scholar Émile Benveniste [Benveniste, 19G9: 3G7] has long 
since demonstrated that there is a basic opposition is in Indo-European languages, 
namely in Latin and Greek, it points out a fundamental difference in the ways the 
two cultures meant citizenship: while both kept the distinction between the built 
city (asty in Greek, urbs in Latin) and the inhabited city (polis in Greek, civitas in 
Latin), for the Greeks it was the belonging to the polis which made the inhabitants 
citizens, while for the Latins it was the community of citizens (cum-cives) the 
ground on which the entire city relied. 
This cultural distinction is relevant to our topic for its emphasis on the 
necessity of thinking about cities taking into account the two sides of the urban 
coin, the two cities, so to speak, at once, as a whole. And this approach is all the 
more important today since mainstream urban planning is still too focused on the 
city of stones, the built environment, while, at the same time, the city of people is 
undergoing a radical change. 
Everyone knows that traditional “social containers” [Taylor, 1994] – nation- 
states, households, educational institutions – are challenged by the proliferation, 
spreading, and massive influence of the so-called social media: even in politics, 
where by now communication through social media has become a prominent 
battlefield to gain and keep public consensus, like in an endless election campaign. 
The fact is that, notwithstanding this situation was foreshadowed already in 
the G0s by some urban planning scholars, like Melvin Webber, the practice of 
public urban planning is still anchored to an old fallacy: the “therapeutic illusion 
of space” [Maciocco and Tagliagambe, 2009: 1]. 
On the one hand, today, one belongs to different and delocalised communities 
of interests and the quantity and intensity of individual interactions are no longer 
a direct function of proximity and population density, on the other hand, the 
constant attempt to characterise one's own experiences relative to places is not 
abandoned. 
This is the missing link of planning in which resides the gap between the two 
cities. 
Planning still seems disinclined or unwilling to give up the old “therapeutic 
illusion of space”: the idea of improving cities’ life by operating on the built  
environment, assuming, in doing this, that there is a natural overlapping between 
physical space and social space, while it is not the case [Maciocco, 2014: 2]. 
Besides, the social tensions fuelled by the 2008 crisis come from a dissolving 
social terrain, which, as Alain Touraine has long demonstrated, is composed of 
individuals who increasingly do not consider themselves in social terms but rather 
in cultural terms. 
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In the face of the universalism of political rights, we are seeing ever more the 
insular concerns of cultural rights: below the global struggle for citizenship, which 
is shown as the core of the question of immigration, cultural claims are working, 
that are always particular. 
But, the most pertinent and urgent question is: 
The crisis and the end of the social issues lead in very different directions, from 
the return of the idea of secularisation, which eliminates any recourse to principles 
located outside social exchanges, to the most extreme – that is the most 
desocialised – forms of individualism, which defines a minimalist morality (...). 
Knowing that, in industrial society and in previous societies, the social actor was 
guided by a meta-social principle - God, human nature, progress or the future -, is 
it possible for us, in a post-social situation, to find an equivalent - necessarily non- 
social - of these principles? [Touraine, 2013: 79, italics added] 
Indeed, the disjunction between space and society has long been investigated 
as a genetic feature of the social phenomenon itself [Tarde, 1895; Simmel, 1908; 
Sloterdijk, 2004, pp. 2G1-308; Farinelli, 2014]. However, the end of society comes 
during a phase of convergence of demographic and family structures, of literacy 
rates, drastically reducing the differences between the spaces of experience and 
the horizons of expectations of what once were considered mutually exclusive 
closed civilisations [Courbage, Todd, 2007]. What we thought were compact and 
coherent civilisations, based on different and specific cultural models, are in fact 
local or regional answers or solutions to global issues, in a general framework in 
which new forms of physical and informational mobility (no longer limited to the 
obsolete notion of “migration”: Hoerder, 2002) are increasingly loosening the 
long-standing ties between territories and cultures [Roy, 2008]. 
The spatial multiplicities that we persist in calling them societies [Sloterdijk, 
cit.] cannot be understood by keeping to assume them to be isomorphic not only 
to national spaces but also to a presumed social space that would welcome them 
all, ordering them, based on now-obsolete conceptual pairs – work / non-work, 
individual/social [Virno, 2002], innovation/backwardness [Stiegler, 2019] –, nor it 
is more helpful the obsessive search for neologisms, which characterises much of 
current research in the social sciences. 
What is most relevant to our argument, is the fact that the overlapping between 
social space and national space, as a consequence of nation states’ prevailing  
territorial form worldwide in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was also the 
ground on which legitimate expectations and hopes toward equality and 
democracy were built and defended. 
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2.1 Commons, Places, Trust 
Roberto Esposito has developed a deep and fruitful reflection upon the sense 
of belonging, the sense of identity of citizens, and the notion of property, finding 
a clear contradiction in all mainstream ideas of community: 
“The truth is that these conceptions are united by the ignored assumption that 
community is a "property" belonging to subjects that join them together (…) That 
this possession might refer above all to territory doesn't change things at all, since 
territory is defined by the category of ‘appropriation’, as the originary matrix of  
every other property that follows (…) the most paradoxical aspect of the question 
is that the ‘common’ is defined exactly through its most obvious antonym: what is 
common is that which unites the ethnic, territorial, and spiritual property of every 
one of its members. They have in common what is most properly their own; they 
are the owners of what is common to them all” [Esposito 2009: 2-3, italics added]. 
So, the territory can be considered the reification of this sense of community. 
The neoliberal city has overstressed, overemphasised such owning-related idea 
of community, but this has happened through a “shift from law to ties of 
allegiance” [Supiot, cit.: 312] – so retrieving “feudal” forms of relationships8 on the 
backdrop of the withering-away of the State and the overturning of the public- 
private hierarchy on which states themselves have been built [Supiot, cit.: 273 ff.], 
also impacting, of course, on housing: like in the case of “life time contracts”  
[Nogler and Reifner, 2014]. This meant the breach of social bonds and either the 
dismissal of solidarity and dignity as “unscientific”, or their adoption as long as 
they are subjected to calculation, so paving the way to extreme atomisation of 
communities, no more counting on the heteronomy of the law – a third party 
designed to be above all parties. This is all the more crucial when the basically 
unplanned (and averse to planning), informally structured nature of social “glue” 
is taken into account [Scott, 1999; Sennett, 2018]. 
2.2 Cities as Communities of Mind 
At this point, it should be emphasised that the social “glue” of today's spatial 
multiplicities is increasingly shaped by algorithmic infrastructures [Stiegler, 201G; 
Eubanks, 2019; Longo et alii, 2012], which have become not only the sphere in 
which relationships are increasingly massively channelled (frustrating distinctions 
like public / private sphere), but above all, they are assuming a crucial and pervasive 





8 Which represent consistent examples of what Saskia Sassen calls “capabilities that actually have—whether in 
medieval times, the Bretton Woods era, or the global era—jumped tracks, that is to say, gotten relodged in novel  
assemblages” [Sassen, 2008: 11]. 
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government to governance that has been prevailing in Europe since the 1990s 
[Supiot, 2015]. 
Such algorithmic pervasiveness – which has found the ideal fuel in the mutual 
strengthening between automation as an "objective" substitute for political 
subjectivity and the rise of techno-sciences under the aegis of neoliberalism – has 
been restraining localities in a private (in the original sense of ‘being deprived of’) 
public sphere [Stiegler, Le Collectif Internation, 2020], divesting them of the 
capability to forming shared territorialities, left prey to purely defensive reactions 
that populisms take advantage of, so going against the very collective nature of 
human mind. 
The human brain is the only brain in the biosphere whose potential cannot be 
realised on its own. It needs to become part of a network before its design features 
can be expressed. Since we are living beings, the networks we create are complex, 
fuzzy, and multilayered, rather than lean and mean, or driven solely by the needs 
of symbolic communication. This makes our networks radically different from 
those that have been invented for nonliving entities, such as computers (…). The 
cognitive infrastructure of human culture includes many things that we do not 
normally call symbolic, such as patterns of public action, the built environment, 
and conventional expressions of emotion. These things are the cognitive purpose, 
because they convey a great deal about intention, bonding, affiliation, attachment, 
and hierarchy. They provide structure. 
The role played by culture, not only in giving shape to our relationships but also 
(and maybe above all) in being the ground on which our minds grow and thrive 
collectively, highlights that individualism – as an anthropological trait stimulated 
and promoted by mainstream versions of neoliberal thought – goes against a 
primaeval evolutionary characteristic of humans. 
The result is that we are plugged-in, as no other species before us. We depend 
heavily on culture for our development as conscious beings. And by exploiting this 
connection to the full, we have outdistanced our mammalian ancestors (…) Without 
culture, our world-models, those highly personal and idiosyncratic visions of current 
reality that define all conscious experience, will inevitably shrivel. If we line up the key 
features of the many different kinds of minds that coexist with us on Earth and rank 
the breadth and complexity of their world models, we can see how deeply we depend 
on our cultural hook-up. [Donald, 2001: 324]. 
2.3 Ow(n)ing and Belonging 
As Claude Raffestin has pointed out, there is a dialectic interplay between 
possession and property, between the German Besitz that indicate occupation, i.e., 
the verb besetz, and the concept of property, or Eigentum. Although the 
distinction between possession and property tends if not to disappear at least to 
fade, we must recall that they are two different things, be they material things or 
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not. As far as edges are concerned, there is likely a deliberate confusion between 
possession and property, or, if you prefer, a fusion, which is in some way the 
outcome of the refusal to accept norms one doesn’t want to acknowledge 
[Raffestin, 201G: 120]. 
The long-standing legacy of the conceptual couple community/property fades 
along certain edges, which define a geography of cities as urban realms where a 
radical shift in such logic takes place. 
The Western tradition of the city – as the privileged birthplace, homeland, 
cradle of politics, and, particularly, of democracy – it is indeed a story of 
exceptions, of unlikely experiments carried out at the edge of major political and 
economic systems, which could have vanished many times at a history’s turn and 
being forgotten. 
On the other hand, the Mediterranean urban history offers many lessons to be 
learnt on this matter. That the city is divided and divisive in itself [Loraux, 1997]. 
But, at the same time, that through the relation of tangible (the built environment) 
and intangible (human relations, in the broader sense), it constitutes a collective 
mind, a common intelligence, perhaps the oldest known experiment of artificial 
intelligence (in the precise sense of the cultural nature of human beings, namely 
naturally artificial beings) [Neve, 2018]. 
This is why today studying the Mediterranean can provide insights into what is 
happening in the rest of the world [Leontidou, 1993; Neve, forthcoming]. 
Madrid has the largest shantytown in Europe (1G kilometres long and over 7300 
inhabitants). Seventeen nationalities coexist in an eclectic collection of self-built 
houses. Such a forgotten barrio, Cañada Real, parallel to the M50 motorway, 
reveals a striking diversity in the forms of housing, ranging from the simple 
bungalow to high houses of several stories. 
Since its creation dates back to the seventies, Cañada Real has achieved a 
certain level of self-organisation: being divided into six sections, each 
distinguished by its housing conditions and age. However, the houses in Sector 1 
(the oldest) are now authorised and integrated into the village of Coslada. They 
have municipal facilities such as garbage collection, running water and electricity. 
Thus, part of the Cañada Real has become visible de jure, while the other sectors 
(at least two of them) should be demolished by decree of the Municipality of 
Madrid [Pattem, 2019]. 
In a world overwhelmed by competing (often deceitful) narratives, research 
taking Anthropocene’s issues seriously must also account for such elusive edges, 
instead of lingering on comfortably familiar mindsets. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
The global character and the severity of the housing issue bring to the fore, 
perhaps more than any other matter, the burden of inequalities generated by 
urban neoliberal policies. 
And not only because it mostly affects the poorest countries as well as the 
poorest areas within affluent regions and nations, but also because of its nature of 
cross-cutting issue, also impacting on people once supposed to belong to the 
middle class but unable to be considered eligible for welfare in the withering-away 
of the State intensified by neoliberal policies. 
Besides, birth-rate trends have been already showing for a long time the 
growing gap between a shrinking minority which can afford to enjoy the benefits 
of globalisation and the increasing underdogs [De Blij, 2009]; trends which the 
current pandemic, while aggravating life conditions for the have-nots (for good 
measure), does not seem capable of substantially modifying their course [UNFPA, 
2021]. 
But the gravest impact of the neoliberal city strikes what was once one of the 
basic tenets of modern State: civil cohabitation. 
When the heteronomy of law is annihilated, speaking of belonging becomes 
meaningless. In the background of relationships in which everyone must serve the 
interests of those on whom he or she depends and be able to rely on the loyalty of 
those who depend on him or her on the strict basis of self-interest, there is no place 
for universal rights or principles, let alone a human right like housing. 
Such fatal drift could be reversed not leaving powerful tools like ICT to a private 
use through which relationships are shaped and driven by private companies’ 
marketing to feed consumption. But reactivating a real public sphere, reaffirming 
the value of principles like dignity and solidarity, while reinstating the trust in the 
law, which means, as far as the EU is specifically concerned, to find a way to 
dissolve the contradiction between sovereignty and subsidiarity. 
Notwithstanding the oversimplified tone of such suggestions, forced by the 
limits of an article, we believe that they envisage a feasible perspective, so that 
cities return to truly being communities of mind. 
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